which individual members of society share similar value priorities. Instead of characterizing nations in terms of the values of their typical member, we investigate the degree of value homogeneity or heterogeneity in the nation.
According to Comte, a long theoretical tradition views value consensus as a basis for social order (Comte, cited in Partridge, 1971 ; see also Durkheim, 1947; Etzioni, 1988; Parsons, 1968; Shils, 1975) . Value consensus is believed to contribute to social stability by increasing cooperation and reducing the probability that violence will be used to resolve conflict. It facilitates accommodations among conflicting interests and demands, and it limits the area and issues of conflict (Partridge, 1971; Shils, 1975) . Commitment to shared values encourages members of a society to identify with one another, to accept common goals, and to agree on the norms that prescribe how these goals should be achieved (Cohen, 1968; Kahl, 1968) . Thus, levels of value consensus may be as important a feature of culture as levels of value importance.
Although value consensus is mentioned frequently in theoretical discussions, it has not been studied systematically either in sociological or in social psychological research (Rossi & Berk, 1985) . The factors that lead to change in value importance may also be relevant to understanding influences on societal value consensus. For example, modernization theorists argue that exposure to industrialized work settings produces individuals who emphasize modern values (e.g., openness to new ideas) and reject traditional values (e.g., conformity; see Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Kahl, 1968) . As increasingly larger proportions of the population are exposed to the same life conditions and adapt their values to these conditions, this might increase consensus around the high importance of adaptive values (e.g., flexibility and openness) and the low importance of nonadaptive values (e.g., obedience and tradition; see Kohn & Schooler, 1983) .
One implication of this type of analysis is that, depending on the specific value, value importance and value consensus may be positively or negatively associated, or not associated at all. As we shall demonstrate, this is indeed the case. Consequently, studies of value consensus add a new element to crosscultural research. The current study is a first attempt to investigate empirically the nature of societal consensus on values and to relate value consensus to value importance. We note at the outset that our data are problematic for addressing these issues. We use data from matched samples of teachers from 42 countries rather than data from representative samples. Nonetheless, as a first step in a new area, our data are informative.
This article examines two central characteristics of societies that are likely to influence and/or be influenced by value importance and consensus: socioeconomic (level of development) and political (level of democratization). Both characteristics are related to industrialization, and both have been linked to culture change (Inglehart, 1977 (Inglehart, , 1997 Schwartz, 1993) . We first generate hypotheses about the relations of these variables to value importance, and then generate hypotheses concerning their relations to value consensus. Finally, we test the hypotheses with data from 42 countries around the world.
VALUE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT
To conceptualize and measure value systems, we use an approach developed by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 1994a Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987 . 1 This approach defines individual values as desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people's lives (see also Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973) . We provide a brief overview of those aspects of the theory essential for understanding the current research.
VALUE CONTENT
The content component that discriminates among values is the type of motivational goal they express. Ten motivationally distinct types of values, presumed to encompass the range of values recognized across cultures, were derived from the universal requirements of human existence. Cross-cultural research in 44 countries has verified that people discriminate implicitly among these types of values when rating their importance (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 1994a . Table 1 provides definitions of each motivational type of values in terms of its central goal and lists specific values that primarily express the goal.
VALUE STRUCTURE
In addition to identifying 10 motivational types of values, the theory explicates the dynamic relations among them. The pursuit of each type of values has psychological, practical, and social consequences that may conflict or be congruent with the pursuit of other value types. For example, the pursuit of Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 467 conformity values is likely to be compatible with the pursuit of security values: Actions intended to promote obedience and self-discipline are also likely to foster the attainment or maintenance of social order and family security. However, these same actions are likely to conflict with actions promoting self-direction values such as independence and freedom. The circular structure in Figure 1 portrays the total pattern of relations of conflict and congruity among values. Competing value types emanate in opposing directions from the center; complementary types are in close proximity going around the circle. The 10 value types are organized on the two orthogonal, bipolar dimensions also shown in Figure 1 . One dimension opposes openness to change (self-direction and stimulation) to conservation (conformity, tradition, and security). The other opposes self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence) to self-enhancement (achievement and power). Hedonism shares elements of both openness and self-enhancement. This structure has been confirmed by research in many countries (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 1994a . Although individuals differ substantially in the importance they attribute to values that comprise the 10 value types, the same, near universal structure of motivational oppositions and compatibilities apparently organizes their values.
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VALUE CONSENSUS
According to Comte, value consensus is usually defined as concurrence among members of a society concerning their values (Comte, cited in Partridge, 1971 ; see also Cohen, 1968; Horowitz, 1962; Shils, 1975) . Given our definition of values, this translates into agreement among individual members of a society concerning the importance they attribute to different types of values. The greater the agreement among individuals concerning the importance or unimportance of a value type, the greater the value consensus in a society concerning that value type. If individuals agree on the priority accorded to all 10 value types, the overall level of value consensus in society is high.
A useful index of societal value consensus should provide scores that reflect the degree of agreement among societal members concerning both particular value types and their overall value system. Such scores could be used to compare the level of consensus in different societies and to assess the relations of value consensus to other variables. Several researchers have measured intranational variation or heterogeneity using the standard deviation of a variable across the members of a national sample (e.g., Au, 1998; Ester, Halman, & de Moor, 1994; Veenhoven, 1995) . We adapted this approach for value consensus by computing the standard deviation of the importance attributed to a value type by the members of each national sample. Because this is a measure of dissensus, we reverse the signs of associations when discussing value consensus.
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HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONS OF SOCIETAL CHARACTERISTICS TO VALUE IMPORTANCE AND CONSENSUS
Through contact with societal institutions, group members learn the values inherent in the ways that institutions are organized and in the ways they function. Values are expressed in the customs, laws, norms, scripts, and practices to which people are exposed every day (Bourdieu, 1972; Markus & Kitayama, 1994) . Values are used to promote, legitimize, interpret, and sanction both existing and innovative social behavior (Schwartz, 1993; Williams, 1968) . People adapt their own values to fit the opportunities and demands of the significant societal institutions in their lives and generalize these values to other life realms (Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) . Here, we focus on two societal characteristics that are likely to affect values because of their crucial influence on the forms societal institutions take: (a) level of socioeconomic development-the social structural component of modernization, and (b) level of democratization-conceptualized in terms of political rights and civil liberties. These characteristics are, of course, interrelated. Socioeconomic development is often linked to the emergence of democratic institutions (Jackman, 1975; Lipset, 1994; Portes, 1973; Yang, 1988) . However, as recent events in Eastern Europe and the Far East have shown, democratization of totalitarian systems may either precede or follow economic development. Moreover, as we argue below, socioeconomic development and democratization can have different, even opposite, implications for value consensus.
To ground the hypotheses concerning consensus requires us to specify first the nature of the relations of value importance to socioeconomic development and democratization. However, the main focus of this article is on value consensus. Hence, we sketch the rationales for the hypotheses concerning value importance only briefly. Note that our reasoning applies to differences among 42 complex, contemporary national societies. Comparisons of these societies with less developed, tribal, farming, or hunting and gathering societies would doubtless suggest different hypotheses.
VALUE IMPORTANCE
Socioeconomic Development
Modernization theory argues that, as societies industrialize and develop economically, similar institutional features emerge (Eisenstadt, 1973; Inkeles, 1975; Levy, 1966; Meyer, Boli-Bennett, & Chase-Dunn, 1975; Yang, 1988) . People become modern by incorporating the values implicit in the institutions of industrialized societies into their personal value systems. Two comparative studies of the relations of industrialization to value change have found that exposure to industrialized work settings produces individuals who are open to new ideas, value individual initiative over reliance on kin and locality, and judge status according to achievement rather than to position in the traditional hierarchy (Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Kahl, 1968) .
Presumably, these modern values facilitate social and psychological adjustment to the demands of institutions in economically developed societies, whereas traditional values that would interfere with adjustment are rejected (Yang, 1988) . Several cross-cultural studies make similar arguments (e.g., Hofstede, 1980 Hofstede, , 1991 Inglehart, 1977; Lerner, 1964; Schwartz, 1993) . These Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 471 findings and speculations, as well as further reasoning of our own, serve as the bases for hypotheses linking socioeconomic development to the importance of the 10 value types studied here.
The importance of values that emphasize independent thought, innovation and change, and a belief in equality should be greater at higher levels of socioeconomic development. As noted, these are the orientations theorists associate with individual modernity. Hence, we hypothesize that the importance of self-direction, stimulation, and universalism values increases with socioeconomic development. We also hypothesize that the importance of benevolence values increases with socioeconomic development. Modernization and postmodernism theorists claim that structural modernization produces increased emphases on empathy and concern for the dignity of the individual, elements central to benevolence values (Inglehart, 1997) . Moreover, the general increase in affluence associated with industrialization and postindustrialization may limit the more virulent competition for scarce resources that might interfere with benevolence.
Finally, we also hypothesize that the importance of hedonism values increases with socioeconomic development. As affluence increases, opportunities for self-indulgence and pleasure seeking increase as well, and demands for self-denial lose their legitimacy. The increased importance of hedonism values reflects a process of adapting value priorities to the opportunities and constraints that structure one's life chances-upgrading the importance of values that are readily attained and downgrading the importance of those whose pursuit is blocked (Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) .
In contrast, we hypothesize that conformity, security, tradition, and power values become less important as societies develop socioeconomically. These types of values refer to precisely those goals and orientations that are gradually rejected with modernization: an orientation to the past, maintaining the status quo, distaste for new experiences and ideas, belief in rewards based on traditional hierarchy, and an unequal distribution of power (Inglehart, 1997; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Kahl, 1968; Yang, 1988) .
Power and security values may be more important where socioeconomic development is low for other reasons as well. Power values are the least important value type in most nations (Schwartz & Bardi, in press ), suggesting that they are not widely accepted as legitimate justifications for behavior. In less developed nations, however, where poverty is more widespread, open competition and conflict for scarce resources may be accepted more readily as necessary. Hence, power values may be accepted as more legitimate. In these nations, basic insecurities concerning subsistence are widespread, leading to a constant concern with security for many, a concern lessened with increased affluence.
We offer no directional hypothesis for achievement values. As conceptualized by Schwartz (1992; see also Yang, 1986) and measured by the instrument used here, achievement values primarily emphasize success according to social standards rather than personal standards. Like power values, they express the motivation to achieve social superiority. Hence, like power values, their importance may also decrease with socioeconomic development. However, achievement values may also reflect internal standards to some extent. Internal standards, measured as occupational aspirations and achievement motivation, have been related positively to economic development (Inkeles & Smith, 1974; McClelland, 1961) .
Underlying these hypotheses is a focus on variables related to indigenous aspects of social structure and culture. Potential external influences on values such as colonial domination, military relationships, and international trade (Portes, 1973; Tipps, 1973) are not considered. Those who emphasize such influences argue that the prevalence of modern values across societies may largely be a consequence of the diffusion of Western values and behavior patterns, rather than an adaptive response to structural change. Exposure to the international media, trade, and other channels for culture contact may promote adoption of modern values, even in the absence of industrialization and the structural change that accompanies it. If this critique is correct, socioeconomic development should relate only weakly, if at all, to value importance. Hence, results of this study will reflect on the viability of social structural versus diffusion explanations of prevalent values.
DEMOCRATIZATION
Political systems differ widely in the ideals and principles they promote and in the degree of control they exercise over major societal institutions. Thus, the political system is likely to influence both the value priorities of the members of society and the degree of value consensus in society. One critical distinction among political systems is their location along a dimension ranging from democracy to totalitarianism (Christensen, Engel, Jacobs, Rejai, & Waltzer, 1971; Dahl, 1971; Galnoor, 1982; Huntington, 1991) . A discussion of the ideology and structural features of ideal types of democracies and totalitarian regimes points to the implications of democratization for value importance.
According to democratic ideology, the unique individual is the basic unit of society. The natural rights, freedom, morality, rationality, and equality of the individual are emphasized (Christensen et al., 1971; Etzioni, 1996; Graham, 1986; Groth, 1974) . Individual growth is facilitated through free access to information and unlimited opportunities to form unique preferences and Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 473 opinions (Christensen et al., 1971; Dahl, 1971; Galnoor, 1982; Gastil, 1987; Thompson, 1970) . In contrast, totalitarian regimes demand total acceptance of their aims by societal members. Such regimes seek to extend their power and control to all realms of action (economic, social, and political) and of thought, including values and beliefs (Barbu, 1956; Christensen et al., 1971; LeFort, 1986) . Totalitarian ideology legitimizes the regimes' monopoly, not only of power and authority, but also of wisdom and virtue. It defines groups that espouse opposing ideologies as inherently evil, justifying their suppression by all available means (Christensen et al., 1971; LeFort, 1986) . Both democratic and totalitarian ideologies have clear implications for the content of values to be inculcated. Values compatible with democratic ideology are those that emphasize independent thought and action and are favorable to change (self-direction and stimulation values), and those that emphasize tolerance for differences and equality for all (universalism). Autonomy of thought and action and tolerance of differences threaten claims of totalitarian leaders to a monopoly of the one truth. We therefore hypothesize that the importance of self-direction, stimulation, and universalism values increases with democratization of the political system. The centrality of individual autonomy in democratic ideology legitimizes the pursuit of personal pleasure and enjoyment, as long as it does not harm others. In contrast, the sacrifice of individual to collective interests in totalitarian ideology delegitimizes personal pleasure seeking. We therefore hypothesize that the importance of hedonism values increases with democratization.
Democracy teaches compromise and trust more than totalitarianism does (Barbu, 1956; Dahl, 1971) . Suspicion and intolerance, exacerbated by encouraging citizens to inform on one another, permeate totalitarian states (Musil, 1992; Nowak, 1988) . This filters into day-to-day interaction, causing a wariness and lack of trust that may undermine commitment to benevolence values such as honesty and forgiveness. We therefore also hypothesize that the importance of benevolence values increases with democratization.
In contrast, we hypothesize that the importance of conformity, tradition, security, and power values decreases with democratization. Conformity, tradition, and security are conservation values that emphasize maintaining the status quo and avoiding change, as well as accepting restraints imposed by social norms and institutions. Power values express a motivation for control and dominance over people and resources and an acceptance of authority based on hierarchical relations. These values conflict with such basic principles of democratic ideology as individualism, change, and equality for all, but are clearly compatible with totalitarian ideology and the preservation of a totalitarian political system.
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We offer no directional hypothesis concerning the relation of achievement values to democratization. The motivational goal of this value type is compatible with the aims of both democratic and totalitarian systems. Individual achievement that elicits social approval is essential for productivity in both types of states. The literature on democratic and totalitarian ideologies does not mention achievement values.
The two societal characteristics discussed here, socioeconomic development and democratization, are hypothesized to have a similar pattern of influence on value importance. They should increase the importance of the openness and self-transcendence value types (universalism, benevolence, self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism), and should decrease the importance of the conservation value types (security, conformity, and tradition) and power values. No directional hypotheses are offered for achievement values. In contrast, we postulate that these two societal characteristics have different, even conflicting, influences on value consensus. Shils (1975) proposed that in the process of structural modernization, the various segments of the population, each with its separate system of values, are brought under the influence of a single unified economic and political system. Modernization promotes more widely shared experiences in common social institutions. People from different segments of the society acquire information from the same national media, send their children to a centralized education system, work under the conditions of an encompassing labor market, and are exposed to a shared political ethos. The mass of the population is gradually integrated into the central institutional and value systems of society. Consequently, people of differing sociocultural backgrounds gradually develop similar value systems. 3 This analysis leads to the general hypothesis that the greater the socioeconomic development of a nation, the greater the overall level of consensus on values. However, the nature of the value change that leads to increased consensus depends on the value type in question. Based on our previous analysis, we hypothesize that, with development, there is increased importance of universalism, benevolence, self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism values that leads to greater consensus on these value types. Conversely, with development there is decreased importance of security, conformity, tradition, and power values that leads to greater consensus on these value types. Concerning Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 475 achievement values, no change in consensus is predicted because the effects of socioeconomic development on their importance are unclear. Figure 2 illustrates the hypothesized patterns for hedonism and conformity values. The value ratings in less developed societies are illustrated on the left-hand side. Conformity is more important than hedonism, as shown by the mean ratings of these two values on the importance vector. Yet there is low consensus concerning the importance of both conformity and hedonism, as shown by the elongated, oval-shaped distributions of individual value ratings around the societal means along the importance vector. In more developed societies (see right-hand side), the mean ratings indicate that hedonism has become more important than conformity, reflecting the predicted influences of development on these two values. At the same time, consensus concerning the importance of both conformity and hedonism has increased, as shown by the narrower, circular distribution of individual value ratings around the societal means on the importance vector.
VALUE CONSENSUS
Socioeconomic Development
Democratization
Democratic ideology has clear implications not only for which values people acquire, but also for how much freedom they have to choose different values. Democratic ideology decries coercion or manipulation of citizens to adopt particular values. Ideally, individuals are encouraged to develop and express their own value priorities. Democracies permit and encourage a wide range of disparate lifestyles, opinions, and subgroups (Thompson, 1970) . This may foster societal diversity concerning the importance of all 10 types of values.
In totalitarian political systems, major institutions expose individuals to a more monolithic value system. Government control of the media, the education system, and other institutions aims to indoctrinate citizens to accept official values and to reject alternative preferences (Avis, 1987; Galnoor, 1982; Roskin, 1991) . Sharing the dominant values contributes to citizens' sense of social identity and solidarity. Totalitarianism may sometimes elicit public compliance rather than true acceptance of the values of the regime (Rupnik, 1988) . In all events, totalitarian states would be characterized by a high degree of reported value consensus. In sum, we hypothesize that the greater the degree of democratization of the political system of a country, the lower the level of consensus on all 10 value types and, therefore, the lower the overall level of consensus on values.
values are hypothesized to increase in importance with democratization and power values to decrease in importance; yet consensus is hypothesized to decrease with democratization for both types of values. In extreme totalitarian regimes, we expect substantial consensus that stimulation values are relatively unimportant and that power values are moderately important (see Figure 3 , left-hand side). As societies democratize, subgroups obtain greater freedom to reject dominant societal values, to socialize their members to spurn the corrupting influences of changing societal values, and to conserve traditional values or adopt new values more in keeping with their special interests and experiences. Although the mean importance of stimulation values may increase and the mean importance of power values may decrease, consensus drops because these subgroups do not go along with the dominant value change, whereas other subgroups change even more dramatically than the average (see Figure 3 , right-hand side). Significantly, the hypothesized effects on value consensus of democratization and of socioeconomic development are opposed: Value consensus is expected to decrease with democratization but to increase with development. Because democratization and modernization tend to vary together, this means that each is likely to suppress the effects of the other on value consensus. In a highly developed and democratic country like Sweden, for example, value consensus may be neither high nor low, because development increases consensus while democratization allows the emergence of heterogeneous value priorities. To discern the independent effects on value consensus of socioeconomic development and democratization, we control each one statistically when examining the other.
METHOD PROCEDURE AND SAMPLES
Matched samples of school teachers in 42 countries responded anonymously to questionnaires between 1988 and 1994. The samples are briefly described in Table 2 . Respondents completed the value survey and reported their gender, age, education, marital status, religiosity, ethnic identity, and urban/rural residence. They responded in their native language, in group settings in about 75% of the samples, and individually in the rest. Teachers in each sample lived in urban areas and taught the full range of subjects in grades 4 to 12 of the most common type of school system in their country. The female percentage in each sample reflects the gender distribution of teachers in each country. In nearly every country, teachers' income places them in the lower middle class, and their prestige is in the upper middle class. No single occupational group represents a nation, but school teachers may be better than most groups for studying values because they are expected to play an explicit role in value socialization and they are presumably key carriers of culture.
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Ideally, we would like to compare value priorities across representative national samples. In the absence of comprehensive data on the 10 value types from representative samples in many nations, we adopted a matched samples approach. This approach assumes that the order of nations on their value priorities, based on the matched samples, approximates the order that would be obtained with representative samples. This is a hazardous assumption, but we can bring some evidence to support it in the present case. Values data are available from representative or near representative samples in 11 of the 42 nations we studied. 5 This enables us to assess whether the order of value importance and consensus obtained with teacher samples reasonably approximates the order found in these nations. Research using matched samples has uncovered many plausible and systematic cross-national differences (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Williams & Best, 1982) .
The more ethnically heterogeneous a nation, the less well the value consensus of majority ethnic teachers is likely to represent societal value consensus. We therefore assessed the potential of national ethnic heterogeneity for confounding the relations of democratization and socioeconomic development with value consensus. The correlations of ethnic heterogeneity with democratization (r = -.09) and socioeconomic development (r = -.22) were quite small. 6 Controlling for national ethnic heterogeneity had almost no effect on the relations of democratization and socioeconomic development to value consensus.
INDEXES OF VARIABLES
Value importance. The importance that respondents attributed to each of the value types was measured with the Schwartz (1992) value survey. Respondents were asked to rate each of 56 single values "as a guiding principle in my life" on a 9-point scale ranging from 7 (of supreme importance) to -1 (opposed to my values). The 45 values from the value survey that were used in our analyses have been demonstrated to have relatively stable meanings across 44 countries (Schwartz, 1994a) . To index the importance of each value type, the mean ratings given to the single values that represent it were averaged. Individual differences on these value indexes demonstrate meaningful associations with a wide variety of attitudinal, behavioral, and background variables in studies in at least 18 different nations (for references, see Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bardi, in press ).
Value consensus. The standard deviation of the importance scores that individuals within a sample attributed to a value type measured dissensus on each of the 10 value types. The average of these 10 standard deviations, each weighted equally, measured overall value dissensus (listed in column 5 of Table 2 ). Because these are indexes of dissensus, we reversed the signs of associations to assess value consensus. Democratization. Gastil's (1987) ratings of the political rights and civil liberties of citizens in each country were combined to index democratization. Political rights refer to citizens' rights to participate in determining the nature of the law and its administration. Civil liberties refer to the freedoms that make it possible to mobilize new, alternative, or nonofficial opinions, as well as freedom of religion and residence. The two ratings correlated .94 across the countries studied.
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RESULTS
ADEQUACY OF THE DATA FOR TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
We first examined whether there were variables on which the samples were not well matched that might affect the predicted associations. The samples were similar on education, income, and ethnic homogeneity. They differed considerably in their distributions on age and gender (as shown in Table 2 ) and on religious homogeneity.
The following were the only significant correlations of these sample characteristics with the variables of interest in this study: Mean age of sample correlated with socioeconomic development (r = .41), with the importance of hedonism (r = -.30), achievement (r = -.34), power (r = -.30), and benevolence (r = .34) values, and with consensus on stimulation (r = .32) and benevolence values (r = .37). Female percentage correlated with level of democratization (r = -.37), the importance of security (r = .36), and consensus on benevolence (r = .37) values. Controlling for mean age and female percentage had no meaningful effects on the prediction of value importance or consensus by socioeconomic development and democratization. Some correlations increased slightly and others decreased, but none reversed direction. Thus, observed differences in sample composition do not account for the results reported below.
Next, we assessed how well the order of nations on value importance and value consensus, based on teacher samples, approximated the order one would find with representative samples. The top panel of Table 3 presents data for value importance. Pearson correlations between the importance of a value type in the representative sample and in the teacher sample from a nation, across 11 nations, ranged from .61 (conformity and stimulation) to .84 (power). The bottom panel of Table 3 presents data for value consensus.
Pearson correlations between the consensus on a value type in representative and teacher samples from a nation, across the 11 nations, ranged from .55 (tradition) to .79 (stimulation). For overall value consensus, the correlation was .86. These findings increase the plausibility of viewing the order of value priorities and value consensus based on the teacher samples as reasonable indicators of the relative importance of and consensus on values across nations. Pending the availability of data from representative samples, it seems justified to use these data to address the questions of this study.
Because teacher samples are likely to be more homogeneous than representative samples, we expected the consensus scores obtained from teacher samples to overestimate within-society value consensus. The data in the bottom panel of Table 3 confirm this expectation. Across the 11 nations, the mean standard deviation was significantly higher in the representative samples (i.e., the consensus was lower) for every value type but tradition, all t(20) > 1.74, p < .05, one-tailed. Indeed, excluding tradition values, consensus was higher in the teacher sample than in the matched representative sample in 95 of the 99 comparisons (11 nations × 9 value types). Thus, teacher samples do overestimate value consensus. However, as the correlations between consensus scores for teacher and representative samples indicate, the degree of overestimation was fairly similar across nations, so the order of nations was fairly well maintained.
Finally, we examined the extent to which value importance and value consensus constitute distinct constructs. For this purpose, we correlated the mean importance of each value type with its consensus index across the 42 samples. These correlations ranged from -.30 (power) to .58 (security), with a mean (based on r to Z transformation) of .23. Clearly, the relationship between value importance and value consensus is neither very high nor consistent across different types of values. Thus, we can learn different things from studying value importance and value consensus. We turn next to the tests of the hypotheses. Table 4 presents the correlations of socioeconomic development and democratization with the importance of the 10 value types. Of the 18 hypothesized associations, 17 were significant: The higher the levels of both socioeconomic development and democratization, the greater the importance attributed to self-direction, stimulation, universalism, benevolence, and hedonism values, and the less the importance attributed to power, conformity, and security values. Also, as hypothesized, socioeconomic development correlated positively with tradition values. Only the hypothesized negative Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 483 relationship between democratization and tradition values was not supported, though the correlation was in the expected negative direction. Democratization was unrelated to the importance of achievement values, as expected. Though not hypothesized, achievement values were significantly less important in more developed countries (p < .05). Socioeconomic development and democratization were substantially correlated across the nations in this study (r = .51). Hence, separating their effects is difficult. Socioeconomic development was more strongly related to the importance of conformity, tradition, and achievement values, and democratization was more strongly related only to security values, all t(39) > 1.98, p < .05. The third column of Table 3 presents the variance in value importance jointly explained by the two predictors.
VALUE IMPORTANCE
VALUE CONSENSUS
We hypothesized that socioeconomic development and democratization have opposing influences on value consensus. We therefore computed the correlations of each with value consensus, both with and without controlling the effects of the other. The top panel of Table 5 reveals that socioeconomic development correlated positively with overall value consensus (r = .34), and controlling democratization substantially increased this correlation (r = .50). The zero-order correlation of democratization with overall value consensus Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 485 NOTE: N = 42 nations. a. The two-tailed probability that this unpredicted correlation differs from zero is < .05. *p < .10, one-tailed. **p < .05, one-tailed.
was negative (r = -.15), as predicted, but not significant. However, controlling socioeconomic development yielded a substantial and significant negative correlation (r = -.41). Together, the two predictors accounted for 31% of the cross-national variance in overall value consensus (see column 5). Thus, each of these predictors suppressed the effect of the other. Table 5 also presents the correlations of socioeconomic development and democratization with value consensus on each of the 10 value types. Again, controlling each predictor when examining the effects of the other brought the correlations more in line with the hypotheses. We reasoned above that socioeconomic development, unconfounded by democratization, promotes consensus concerning nine value types (all but achievement). Controlling for democratization, 5 of the 9 correlations were reliably positive and none was negative. For achievement, no association was predicted and none was found.
We also reasoned above that democratization permits and may even promote societal diversity concerning the importance of all kinds of values. We therefore hypothesized that the correlations of democratization with all 10 of the value types, unconfounded by socioeconomic development, are negative. The results in column 4 of Table 5 largely support this hypothesis. With socioeconomic development controlled, democratization correlated negatively with value consensus concerning the importance of 9 of the 10 value types (all but hedonism). Eight of these correlations were reliable at the .10 level. As shown in column 5, socioeconomic development and democratization, together, explained between 4% and 43% of the variance in consensus concerning different types of values.
DISCUSSION
This study examined the relations of two structural characteristics of societies to value importance and to value consensus. We discuss the findings relevant to each characteristic in turn.
SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Based on our own analyses and on implications drawn from modernization theory, we theorized that socioeconomic development increases the importance of independent thought and action, openness to change, concern for the welfare of others, self-indulgence and pleasure, and the degree of consensus among citizens that these are relatively important goals. The positive correlations of socioeconomic development with the importance of the selfdirection, stimulation, benevolence, and hedonism values clearly supported this theorizing. The positive, partial correlations with consensus on all these value types were also supportive. However, the near zero partial correlation of development with consensus on universalism values was unexpectedly weak. To better understand the latter finding, we examined the correlations of development with consensus separately among poorer and more affluent nations. Significant curvilinear relations emerged for universalism and benevolence values. For the 21 poorer nations in our sample (GNP per capita up to $4,195 in 1986) , socioeconomic development (controlled for democratization) correlated substantially and positively with consensus on universalism (r = .52, p < .05) and benevolence (r = .63, p < .05) values. For the 21 more affluent nations (GNP per capita greater than $4,195), no significant positive correlations with consensus were found for universalism (r = -.01) or benevolence (r = .17).
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What might these curvilinear patterns signify? Universalism and benevolence, the two self-transcendence value types, are among the three most important value types for most people in most nations worldwide. It is natural for people to value them highly (Schwartz & Bardi, in press ). Nonetheless, in nations where life conditions are very difficult, some individuals are so preoccupied with their own survival needs that they may attribute little importance to the needs of others. This would give rise to the lower value consensus for universalism and benevolence observed in the poorest nations. As national income rises and life conditions improve, most people may acquire sufficient resources to free them from total self-preoccupation and allow them to express the natural tendency to attribute high importance to self-transcendence values. Once economic development reaches a threshold (about $4,195 in 1986 terms), self-transcendence values are highly endorsed by the vast majority of the population, resulting in high consensus. This creates a ceiling effect like the one Inglehart (1997) reports for economic development and life expectancy. 9 We also theorized that the values whose core goals are gradually rejected with modernization become less important with socioeconomic development. This includes security, tradition, and conformity values, with their veneration for the past, distaste for new ideas and experiences, and emphasis on maintaining the status quo. It also includes power values, with their respect for hierarchy and acceptance of unequal distribution of resources. Power values may also become less important because increasing affluence may weaken the legitimation of overt competition for resources. The significant negative correlations of socioeconomic development with the importance of these four value types supported this theorizing.
In keeping with the modernization thesis, we also theorized that socioeconomic development increases consensus concerning the relative unimportance of security, conformity, tradition, and power values. The findings supported this theorizing only for power values, but no increase in consensus was observed for security, conformity, and tradition values, the three conservation value types. Examining the correlations of development with consensus separately among poorer and more affluent nations revealed the hypothesized associations in the more affluent nations, but not in the poorer nations. For the 21 more affluent nations, development (controlled for democratization) correlated positively with consensus in security (r = .35, p < .10), conformity (r = .39, p < .05), and tradition (r = .94, p < .05). For the poorer nations, the respective correlations were .14, .08, and -.30, none significant.
We earlier proposed that the reason consensus concerning conservation values increases with socioeconomic development is because experience with structurally modernized economies leads societal members toward agreement that these values are relatively unimportant. The consensus findings suggest the following possible sequence. In very poor societies, there is moderate consensus that conservation values are quite important, with only the more affluent attributing moderate importance to them. With socioeconomic development, the importance of conservation values gradually drops, but across the whole population, so consensus remains moderate. As affluence spreads and the importance of conservation values drops further, however, a floor effect occurs and a consensus emerges on their unimportance. Analysis of relevant data partially supports this speculation.
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For achievement values, we discussed ways in which socioeconomic development might either increase or decrease their importance, and we proposed no directional hypotheses. In fact, a substantial negative correlation was observed. This finding fits the view promulgated in the value theory (Schwartz, 1992) that achievement values primarily express the motivation to attain social superiority (close to power values) rather than to surpass internal standards (close to self-direction values). Consensus on achievement values was related only weakly (.15, n.s.) to socioeconomic development, controlling democratization despite the relation of development to the importance of these values. There was relatively little variation in consensus concerning achievement values across all countries. Perhaps this restriction in range limited the strength of the association with development.
The observed relations of value importance and consensus to socioeconomic development largely supported our derivations from modernization theory. So-called modern values are more important and traditional values less important in more economically developed countries. Moreover, consensus concerning the importance of these values is generally greater in more Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 489 developed countries. These findings cannot verify the causal arguments of modernization theory. However, they are compatible with the view that value changes are caused by adaptation to structural changes in the value-forming institutions of society that accompany industrialization, employment in service occupations, increased education, spreading communications, and so forth.
The findings do not support the critiques of modernization theory we have cited. Value diffusion through mass communication, trade, and colonial domination may contribute to the correlation of development with value importance. However, this is a less plausible alternative or supplementary explanation for the value consensus results. The continuing debate about structural versus other explanations of value change should now consider change in value consensus as well.
DEMOCRATIZATION
The findings revealed that the more democratic the political system, the greater the importance of values that emphasize autonomy of thought and action, openness to change, care for the welfare of others, and self-indulgence, and the less the importance of values that emphasize dominance and control of others, self-restraint, and maintenance of the status quo. Eight of nine associations of democratization with value importance, hypothesized on the basis of democratic versus totalitarian ideology and practice, were confirmed.
The one unexpected finding was that greater democratization was only weakly associated with less emphasis on tradition values. This finding may reflect the inclusion of 11 nations from the communist bloc in the study. Suppression of religious and ethnic traditions in these nations low in democratization probably reduced the importance of tradition values (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) . Suppression of tradition is specific to communist regimes, and not inherent in totalitarianism. The hypothesized negative correlation between democratization and the importance of tradition values was found (r = -.79, p < .05) across the 31 noncommunist nations.
We reasoned that societal value consensus decreases with democratization because democracies permit and even encourage individuals and groups to develop and express their own lifestyles and orientations. In contrast, totalitarian regimes try to indoctrinate their citizens to accept the official worldview. Negative correlations of democratization with value consensus, controlling socioeconomic development, supported this reasoning. The findings were significant for overall value consensus and for 8 of the 10 specific value types.
JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
An alternative explanation for the greater value consensus in less democratic countries suggests that compliance to the ideology of the coercive regimes when answering the survey obscures the true value dissent in these countries. The design of the study and additional findings weaken the plausibility of this explanation. First, questionnaires were completed anonymously, most often in groups of at least 30 respondents, and respondents knew that school officials would not see them. Second, respondents spread their ratings of most value items across the full 9-point scale, even in samples from the least democratic countries. Third, within samples from both highly democratic and less democratic countries, individual differences in value priorities related to other individual differences in meaningful ways (e.g., cooperative behavior, political orientations, religiosity, readiness for out-group contact, age, education, ethnicity; see Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; PrinceGibson & Schwartz, 1998; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) . These relations strongly support the view that the value ratings reflect true value priorities rather than compliant responses to normative expectations.
CONCLUSION
This study is a first attempt to investigate empirically the nature of societal consensus on values. We have provided a conceptual definition of value consensus and a method for measuring it that follows from this definition. This approach makes it possible to compare the overall level of value consensus across societies and to compare consensus concerning specific types of values. We have found that value consensus and value importance both relate to central structural characteristics of societies, socioeconomic development, and political democratization. Most interesting is the fact that the patterns of association of these characteristics are similar for importance but opposite for consensus.
The hypotheses we developed were based on reasoning that the primary flow of causality is from social structure to value importance (cf. Inglehart, 1990 Inglehart, , 1997 Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Triandis, 1995) and through importance to consensus. Our findings are compatible with this causal perspective. Nonetheless, causal impacts in the other direction are also possible. For example, value consensus might facilitate democratization and socioeconomic development (Huntington, 1991; Lerner, 1964) . Our findings that consensus on basic values correlated negatively with democratization rather than positively contradict this view. However, it is likely that consensus concerning the Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 491 principles that should guide political and economic organization in society is essential for stable democracies.
The current study drew on data from a large number of societies. However, we did not use representative samples. As a result, it was necessary to make the problematic assumption that the order of nations on value consensus and importance, based on the matched teacher samples, approximates the order that would be obtained with representative samples. The comparisons of the order of nations with the set of representative samples increases the plausibility of this assumption, as does the fact that the findings support a large number of hypotheses. It is essential, however, to replicate this study with data from a large number of representative samples or from other types of matched samples. Until this is done, our conclusions remain tentative.
Critics of contemporary, affluent societies may be surprised by the finding that socioeconomic development relates positively across nations to overall value consensus and to the importance of self-transcendence values. Communitarian critics describe American society (e.g., in a moral crisis) as lacking a shared system of guiding values and pervaded by a radical individualism that demands personal rights and ignores responsibilities to the community (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Etzioni, 1988 Etzioni, , 1994 . However, a closer look at our data enriches the communitarian analysis rather than contradicting it. That analysis applies primarily to the United States, so we comment only on that country as it compares with others.
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The United States is both economically developed and highly democratized. Both development and democratization relate positively to values that emphasize individual autonomy, self-actualization, and self-indulgence (self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism). Both structural factors relate negatively to values that emphasize obligation to the community (tradition, conformity, and security). And democratization may contribute to the lack of value consensus that the communitarians lament by permitting societal subgroups to generate and endorse distinct values.
Furthermore, achievement values are unusually important in our United States sample, relative to the other samples studied, and there is unusual consensus on the importance of these values. This pattern expresses in values the pervasive self-centeredness that critics find in America. In contrast, universalism values are unusually unimportant, expressing a lack of concern for the wider community. Comparatively, consensus on both tradition and universalism values is very low in our United States sample, and consensus on conformity and security values is also low. These four value types are the ones most relevant to major, controversial issues in America today-abortion, affirmative action, crime and its control, welfare, and so forth. Given the low consensus on the relevant value types, it is no surprise that these issues generate 492 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY heated conflict and that the different sides justify their positions by appealing to basic values. This brief application of our data demonstrates that it is necessary to consider both value importance and value consensus and to relate to specific value types to understand culture.
This article examined two of many structural characteristics of societies that may relate to national levels of value importance and consensus. Other societal characteristics we consider most worthy of study are the degree of ethnic and religious heterogeneity, the nature of the dominant religion, and the level of social conflict. External factors such as war, conquest, colonial domination, international alliances and enmities, trade, and aid should also be studied. Regional differences may also suggest cultural factors that merit investigation (note the relatively high consensus in the Far East as compared to the low consensus in Latin America in Table 2 ). The impact of some of these variables on value importance has been considered, but we hope it is now apparent that examining their impact on value consensus can yield insights into another significant dimension of cultural difference.
NOTES
1. We use the theory of individual human values rather than the theory of cultural values (Schwartz, 1994b (Schwartz, , 1999 because the central focus of this research, value consensus, refers to agreement or disagreement among individual members of a society. It is therefore appropriate to measure the types of values that discriminate among individuals rather than cultures (Smith & Schwartz, 1997) .
2. Totalitarian states, guided by such different ideologies as fascism and communism, still share the fundamental features described here (Christensen, Engel, Jacobs, Rejai, & Waltzer, 1971) .
3. This is the case even for marginalized groups in developed as compared to less developed nations.
4. This hypothesis does not challenge the view that consensus on attitudes toward the fundamental principles of political and economic organization is essential to democracy (Ebenstein, 1970; Griffith, Plamenatz, & Pennock, 1956; Prothro & Grigg, 1960) . That view applies to agreement concerning procedures for exercising majority rule, protecting minority rights, and obtaining political power. Agreement on such procedures does not require consensus on the importance of basic values as well.
5. Australia (near representative sample of Adelaide adults, n = 199), Chile (representative national sample, n = 304), East Germany (near representative sample of adults, n = 213), Finland (representative national sample averaged, n = 1,862), France (representative national sample, n = 2,339), Israel (near representative sample of Jerusalem adults, n = 181), Italy (representative national sample, n = 295), Japan (representative sample of Osaka adults, n = 207), the Netherlands (representative national sample of employed males, n = 240), Russia (representative sample of Moscow adults, n = 200), West Germany (near representative sample of adults from several states, n = 295). The Australian, East and West German, and Israeli samples were chosen in a Schwartz, Sagie / VALUE CONSENSUS AND IMPORTANCE 493 manner intended to represent subgroups in proportions similar to their population proportions, but rigorous sampling techniques were not employed.
6. To measure ethnic heterogeneity, we used Taylor and Hudson's (1972) index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. It measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from a country do not speak the same language. For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Slovakia, and Slovenia, we computed this index ourselves.
7. Results using each indicator separately differed little from results using the combined index. Sources for the indicators were, respectively: (a) World Bank (1990) Encyclopedia Britannica (1989) . Data for East European countries that gained independence only recently (Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Slovenia, and Slovakia) were taken from official statistical sources in those countries.
8. Choosing appropriate years for indexing socioeconomic development and democratization is problematic. Substantial research suggests that social structural factors influence culture gradually over long time periods (Fischer, 1989; Inglehart, 1990; Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Putnam, 1993; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) . Given the pace of change, indexes from 1986 to 1987 are probably appropriate for relating to values data gathered over the whole 1988 to 1994 period.
9. Congruent with this explanation, the importance of universalism values and of benevolence values increased significantly with socioeconomic development for the poorer but not for the more affluent countries (universalism: .41 vs. .15, benevolence: .49 vs. .14, respectively).
10. This sequence implies negative correlations between socioeconomic development and the importance of conservation values at all levels of country affluence, with weaker correlations at the highest levels. To assess such a pattern requires at least three levels of affluence. When we trichotomize the countries on affluence, correlations within each set of 14 samples each exhibit the expected pattern, but they are largely unreliable.
11. Schwartz and Ros (1995) discuss the substantial differences between the value cultures of the United States and Western Europe.
